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Deictic Navigation Network:
Linguistic Viewpoint Disturbances in
Schizophrenia
Linde van Schuppen* , Kobie van Krieken and José Sanders
Centre for Language Studies, Radboud University, Nijmegen, Netherlands
This paper introduces the Deictic Navigation Network, a cognitive-linguistic framework
to analyze and clarify the nature of viewpoint disturbances in language, applied to
schizophrenia. We argue that such disturbances have linguistic counterparts in the
use of deixis: linguistic elements of which the interpretation relies on the situational
context of the discourse and their connection to a subject-bound perspective. The
DNN connects such linguistic phenomena to three viewpoint disturbances, which can
manifest in different degrees of extremity: (i) the reduced capacity to recognize one’s
own subjective perspective and the subjective perspectives of others; (ii) the reduced
capacity to separate present perspectives from distinct past, future, and hypothetical
perspectives; and (iii) the reduced capacity to integrate projected viewpoint structures
into the actual here-and-now. We explain how application of the DNN to language in
schizophrenia enables the localization of perspectivization disturbances and helps to
clarify the nature of disturbances in the ability to build complex viewpoint structures in
language as well as cognition.
Keywords: deixis, interaction, intersubjectivity, language, origo, perspective, schizophrenia, subjectivity
INTRODUCTION
Schizophrenia is commonly conceptualized as a so-called “self-disorder” (Mishara et al., 2013),
meaning that the unifying principle that lies at the basis of schizophrenic symptoms is a disturbance
of the “bodily,” or “minimal” self (Gallese and Ferri, 2014; Zahavi, 2014). A profound disruption of
the structures of subjectivity itself, connected to a fundamental alienation from one’s body, might
underlie distinct schizophrenic phenomena, like self-demarcation problems and the experience of
“losing one’s self ” and, by extension, difficulties in managing boundaries between one’s self, the
world and others (Sass, 1994). In aiming to comprehend these schizophrenic phenomena “from
the inside,” researchers across disciplines (linguistics, psychiatry, and cognitive philosophy) focus
on language use, considering that language can be seen as a window into the mind (Lysaker et al.,
2002; Buck and Penn, 2015; Demjén and Semino, 2015; Minor et al., 2015). Studies in this domain
have examined various linguistic categories, such as pronoun use (Buck and Penn, 2015; Hong
et al., 2015; Fineberg et al., 2016) and coherence markers (Saavedra, 2010; Allé et al., 2015; Bedi
et al., 2015; Willits et al., 2018). Although these studies have revealed patterns in language use that
appear typical to schizophrenia patients, it is yet unclear whether and how these linguistic patterns
might correspond to as well as elucidate cognitive deficits associated with the disorder, in particular
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disturbances in the ability to recognize and distinguish subject-
bound perspectives (Corcoran et al., 1997; Langdon and Ward,
2009; Fuchs, 2015; Van Duppen, 2016).
This paper presents an analytical framework that enables
researchers to precisely point out specific cognitive viewpoint
disturbances in schizophrenia through the analysis of language,
specifically through linguistic markers of perspective which
express subjects’ position in relation to others, the world and
themselves (Dancygier and Sweetser, 2012; Igl and Zeman,
2016; Van Krieken et al., 2017). Analyses employing this
framework have the potential to advance our understanding of
the exact nature of viewpoint and intersubjectivity disturbances
in schizophrenia. Such analyses can furthermore inform debates
on the nature of Theory of Mind (ToM)1 in schizophrenia
patients, which comprises the ability to recognize the minds
of others and to (unconsciously) reason about and anticipate
their beliefs, intentions, and desires. Empirical studies have
demonstrated ToM disturbances in schizophrenia patients,
connecting them to various prominent psychotic symptoms
like delusions and thought disorder (Pickup and Frith, 2001;
Langdon and Ward, 2009; Brüne, 2018), although the exact
nature of these disturbances is still debated (Cardella, 2018,
p. 53–63). These deficits seem to be especially prominent in
pragmatic comprehension and production of speech, such as
managing direct speech acts, irony and deceits (Parola et al.,
2018). We propose to turn to an analysis of the language use of
patients to shed more light on theories on intersubjectivity and
self-disturbance, by connecting linguistic phenomena to three
cognitive requirements for perspective-taking.
PERSPECTIVE AND ORIGO
Our point of departure is that cognitive deficits in recognizing
and distinguishing perspectives parallel linguistic expressions
of perspective in intersubjective discourse.2 To describe and
analyze such discourse adequately, a general model is required
of how perspectives are construed and navigated in language
and cognition. We introduce a Deictic Navigation Network that
is intended to do just that. This framework enables analyses of
1The notion of ToM is here used as an umbrella term for all “mindreading”
and social cognition, and not as a commitment to Theory, Simulation Theory or
Interaction Theory but to a pluralistic approach in which individuals make use
of whatever procedure is cognitively least demanding to them in a given context,
presuming that aside from theory and simulation, associations of behaviors with
familiar agents play a crucial role in social understanding (Fiebich and Coltheart,
2015).
2Pienkos (2015) describes four different alterations in the intersubjective
experience of schizophrenic patients: (a) abnormalities of common sense and
conventionality, (b) a pathological sense of openness, (c) feelings of paranoia and
of centrality, and (d) perceptions of devitalization of others. Patients may, for
example, experience others as a threat to their subjectivity because they experience
a blurring of boundaries between themselves and whoever they interact with, i.e.,
a merging of their own perspective and that of the other. Alternatively, patients
may construe the other as a constant threat, keeping others at a distance at all
times, or even fail to recognize the other as a viewpointed being all together.
These different disturbances may all together result in the (partial) loss of a shared
world of (linguistic) meaning. In conversational contexts, these alterations are
expected to manifest in the linguistic orchestration and navigation of the multitude
of perspectives involved in interaction.
viewpoint phenomena in natural discourse by accounting for
two fundamental principles: first, that natural discourse is multi-
viewpointed, and, second, that natural discourse is characterized
by recursive patterns (Sanders et al., 2012). The model is
visualized in Figure 1 and will be introduced below.
The DNN can be seen as a model for intersubjective
communication that represents the multitude of perspectives
which Speaker and Hearer need to represent cognitively – albeit
minimally (Vesper et al., 2010; Butterfill and Apperly, 2013) – and
manage linguistically. This includes the perspectives of Speaker
and Hearer in the Speech Act Domain, which represents the
communicative process in which the discourse is established
here-and-now, as well as the perspectives of subjects that the
discourse is about in the Narrative Domain.
Figure 1 depicts the origo as unifying principle of cognitive
and linguistic perspective taking and navigation, that is, the
vantage point of the speaking subject (Langacker, 1985). The
origo (Bühler, 1934/1982) represents the subject in its immediate
here-and-now and is to be understood as “the origin of a
coordinate system of “subjective orientation” (Fricke, 2002,
p. 208); (Bühler, 1934/1982, p. 102). All perceptual and speech
acts originate in, and are anchored to, this origo, since these
acts are always performed by a body that can only be situated
at one place at one time. When two subjects verbally interact,
the Speaker needs to consider the origo of the Hearer, in
addition to her own, and that of any other actor that figures
in the conversation, and acknowledge that the multitude of
origos corresponds to a multitude of coordinate systems, e.g.:
what counts as here and there is origo-dependent and might
differ between Speaker, Hearer and Others, who all have a
different bodily orientation. The notion of origo can help us
understand the structure of subjective experiences and how these
experiences are expressed in language (Dancygier and Sweetser,
2012; Zeman, 2017).
Successful interaction is a process in which two individuals
take turns as Speaker and Hearer in building and modifying a
common ground that forms the basis for mutual understanding
(Clark and Brennan, 1991; Clark, 1996). This common ground
dynamically encompasses the knowledge that is shared between
people in a specific interaction (“Are you coming to the party?”).
Each interaction revolves around such a common ground that
is built upon the accumulating utterances in the discourse
and feeds upon general knowledge, culturally constituted
schemata and know-how about the world, language, and social
conventions (Sanders et al., 2012). Discourse participants not
only retract information from their common ground, but modify
it during interaction by adding information, correcting for
misunderstandings and checking whether all participants are
on the same page.
Crucially, discourse participants must be able to navigate both
actual and virtual origos in interaction, to fully integrate text
and context in their language comprehension; this requires the
cognitive and pragmatic abilities to use deixis in keeping track
in the origos representation (Sperber and Wilson, 1986/1995). In
the first place, such navigation requirements apply to the origos
of Speaker and Hearer that are represented in the Speech Act
Domain, which depicts the here-and-now of the conversational
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FIGURE 1 | Deictic Navigation Network with a Speech Act Domain representing the origos of Speaker and Hearer in the present and a Narrative Domain
representing the origos of subjects that the discourse is about.
act. Apart from these physical origos, a potentially infinite
number of latent origos can be assumed in each discourse. These
are the origos of subjects that the discourse is about. These
are depicted in the Narrative Domain. This domain roughly
corresponds to what is known as the situation model or mental
model which people mentally construct when producing and
processing a narrative and which they continuously update and
modify as the narrative unfolds in time and space (Zwaan
et al., 1995; Zwaan and Radvansky, 1998). Research within this
situation model framework has shown that people mentally
simulate and may even embody the perspectives of narrative
characters (e.g., Yaxley and Zwaan, 2007; Brunyé et al., 2011),
indicating that people are indeed capable of representing multiple
origos simultaneously and of temporarily projecting their own
origo onto that of others in order to understand scenarios from a
perspective that is not their own present perspective.
In the DNN, the Narrative Domain is conceptualized as
including all references to events and situations that do not
take place in the immediate here-and-now of the Speech Act
Domain. Narrating what happened in the past or could happen
in the future, as well as statements about particular others,
presuppose the mental representation of origos that are available
for projection in the Narrative Domain through simulation
processes. Thus, when narrating an event involving herself (“I
went to a party”), the Speaker – as primary origo – selects
herself-as-secondary-origo-in-the-Narrative-Domain, to which
this particular stretch of discourse is to be deictically anchored
(origo allocation) (Fricke, 2002). Alternatively, when stating that
someone will do something in the future (Linde will go to the
party), the Speaker represents this subject’s origo in the Narrative
Domain, thus construing the event from this subject’s perspective
or, depending on lexical choices, of a third subject’s perspective
that is either made explicit (Linde will come to John’s party) or
remains implicit (Linde will come to the party) (Langacker, 1987).
Note that this Network is inherently recursive: once an origo in
the Narrative Domain is selected as Speaker (Linde said that John
would come to the party), a new Speech Act domain is embedded
which gives rise to a new Narrative Domain with new projected
and latent origos (Sanders et al., 2012); this is depicted on the left
side in Figure 1.
DEICTIC NAVIGATION
The different origos of Speaker, Hearer, and (possibly) others
are all potential vantage points to which the Speaker can
anchor linguistic expressions. For an origo to become
activated as subjective starting point in language, it must be
embedded in deictic structures (Sanders and Van Krieken,
2019). The concept of deixis indicates “those aspects of
language whose interpretation is relative to the occasion
of the utterance: to the time of the utterance, and to times
before and after the time of utterance; to the location of the
speaker at the time of the utterance; and to the identity of
the speaker and the intended audience” (Fillmore, 1966).
More specifically, linguistic expressions are deictic when
they acquire meaning through a connection with an origo
and their interpretation depends on the coordinate system
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within which they function. Deixis, thus, covers all linguistic
expressions that can only be understood in relation to the
subjective orientation of an origo (e.g., temporal adverbs
such as today and next week and demonstratives such as
this and that). Note that in generic, expository utterances,
this origo is non-subjective by nature; compare for instance
the following headline of a Dutch news story: “A woman
from Vriezenveen has died because of the fact that she was
struck by lightning” (Sanders et al., 2012, p. 207).3 In this
instance, the utterance is not deictically anchored to a subject
of consciousness, resulting in a purely objective orientation
of place (not determined), time (past related to an abstract
now-point), and causality (objective relation between lightning
strike and death).
Typical for narrative utterances, by contrast, is that deictic
cues are essential to cognitively localize speech acts and their
participants in (real or virtual) space and time, such as modeled
in the DNN. Hinzen and Rosselló (2015) explicitly connect
schizophrenic language to deixis in terms of pronouns, and
Zimmerer et al. (2017) expand on this concept in introducing
the notion of deictic anchoring to explain that disturbances
in deictic structures in schizophrenic language reveal deviant
ways in which patients relate their viewpoint to aspects in
the world, including entities, events, locations, and time.
Indeed, deixis is not limited to linguistic categories such as
pronouns. Rather, it is the functional principle that connects
all language to situations (Galbraith, 1995). Since such a
connection is by definition bound to an origo as subject-
of-consciousness, all perspective-taking involves deixis. The
phenomenon of deixis is thus relevant throughout language;
moreover, it is informative of the way a subject relates to self,
other, and world.
Building on the notion of deictic anchoring as introduced
by Zimmerer et al. (2017), our aim is to account for various
and complex viewpoint structures in language, informed by
the understanding that there are several inherently different
requirements for correctly applying deixis in interaction
3The defining difference between expository and narrative utterances is the
representation of a subject-of-consciousness (SoC) whose origo can be projected
upon as viewpoint (Sanders et al., 2012). In the news text from the example,
subsequent to the expository headline, a short narrative with subjective origos
unfolds: “(a) She was riding her bike on Friday morning on the Vriezenveenseweg
in Almelo when the thunderstorm broke out. (b) A city doctor who arrived at the
scene investigated the spot with the technical research group. (c) They came to
the conclusion that the woman died due to lightning strike.” In sentence a, the
deictic viewpoint is with the woman (she) as SoC, which is then moved in sentence
b from herself (c: the doctor arrived at the scene) to the doctor and the research
team as SoC (who came to the conclusion). Dutch: (a) Ze fietste vrijdagmorgen op
de Vriezenveenseweg in Almelo toen het noodweer uitbrak. (b) Een gemeente-arts
die ter plaatse kwam, heeft samen met de technische recherche de plek onderzocht.
(c) Ze zijn tot de conclusie gekomen dat de vrouw is overleden door blikseminslag.
Source: July 19, 2009, RTV Oost nieuwsbericht at https://www.rtvoost.nl/nieuws/
99272/Vrouw-overleden-na-blikseminslag). Even in the absence of an explicit
subject in the narrative discourse, some implicit SoC is necessarily represented as
the observer. Compare: “(a) She was riding her bike on Friday morning on the
Vriezenveenseweg in Almelo when the thunderstorm broke out. (b) The spot of
the accident was at the crossing with the Almeloseweg. (c) On the women’s left, as
she rested on the ground, was her purse, on her right was her bike. (d) The woman
had died due to lightning strike.” In other words, the Narrative Domain per se has
a subject-of-consciousness, who – as subject – is represented as a deictic origo by
the Speaker (Sanders et al., 2012).
(Sweetser, 2008). We adapt a variation of Sweetser’s (2008)
requirements for building and understanding complex viewpoint
structures, being (i) to have a bodily experience of one’s own
present viewpoint and see the other as a viewpointed being; (ii)
to project one’s present viewpoint onto others’ viewpoints in the
past and future while maintaining the ability to separate these
viewpoints from one another; and (iii) to integrate projected
viewpoint structures into the actual here-and-now.4
Considering recent work on the phenomenology of
schizophrenia (Pienkos, 2015; Van Duppen, 2016; Fuchs
and Röhricht, 2017; Ratcliffe, 2018), it is probable that in cases
of schizophrenia, one or several of these requirements are not
(fully) met, which is expected to be discernable in language use.
On theoretical grounds, and for analytical reasons, it is important
to identify exactly how linguistic expressions are connected to
the three distinctive perspectivization requirements, i.e.: how can
a study of language in schizophrenia help us understand which
requirements are met and which are not and, by implication, help
us gain insight into the precise nature of cognitive disturbances
in perspective-taking? In the remainder of our article, we will
propose that such understanding can be arrived at through
application of the DNN. Figure 2 depicts the three required
routes that are presupposed for successful narrative interaction.
Note that each of the three routes (i–iii) has a counterpart
in the embedded, recursive domains on the left side of the
representation (i’–iii’).
LINGUISTIC INDICATIONS OF DEICTIC
NAVIGATION DISTURBANCES
Proposing that disturbed deictic navigation is indicative of
disturbances in the three perspective-taking requirements
introduced by Sweetser (2008), we will connect these
requirements to the Deictic Navigation Network, coupling
linguistic utterances to cognitive abilities. Our presumption is
that disturbances can manifest as separate types, each indicative
of a particular cognitive inability in perspective-taking with
a particular (set of) linguistic counterpart(s). Presumably,
however, disturbances will most often appear cumulatively, from
(iii) as a higher order problem at the level of viewpoint projection
and integration winding down to (i) as most fundamental.
Speech Act Domain Disturbance (i)
Not acknowledging a bodily viewpoint that is explicitly one’s own
and not seeing the other as a similarly viewpointed being reflects
a radical form of self-disturbance, in that I-ness and You-ness
are not adequately represented and separated, which finds its
linguistic counterpart in a hybridity of subjects within the direct
environment. This disturbance is located at (i) in Figure 2. The
following excerpt offers an illustration:
(a) But we are all heroes here, aren’t we now? (b) If you think
that, why don’t you take my place? (c) But then we never fear a
4In addition, Sweetser (2008) points out that it is necessary to integrate global,
less viewpointed knowledge as well as local, participant viewpoints and to meta-
navigate this viewpoint system. These meta-viewpoint requirements fall beyond
the scope of the present study.
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FIGURE 2 | Deictic Navigation Network with three Navigation Routes: (i) the navigation of origos in the Speech Act Domain; (ii) the navigation of actual origos in the
Speech Act Domain versus the navigation of projected origos in the Narrative Domain; and (iii) the integration of projected viewpoints structures in the Narrative
Domain into the Speech Act Domain.
place we’ve never been, so you would probably agree to do so,
thinking it’s all my fault.5
In this excerpt, the Speaker merges her own origo and the
Hearer’s in “we all” (sentence a) while at the same time presuming
that “you,” in a conditional state (“if,” sentence b), would not,
and in a generic condition (“never,” sentence c) would indeed
take her place. The mixed references make it unclear whether I
and You are (to be) represented as separate subjects with each
their own origo and corresponding subjective orientation, or
not. In addition, refraining from acknowledging one’s own and
other’s (bodily) perspectives equals the negation of the concept of
perspective as a whole.6 Therefore, a lack of epistemic expressions
that moderate the attribution of feelings or perceptions to either
Speaker or Hearer, and the objective, instead of subjective,
construal of causal connections could also point at Speech
Act Domain disturbances (Langacker, 1985; Dancygier and
Sweetser, 2012). Considering the fundamental intersubjective
nature of language, a breakdown of these fundamental structures
of subjectivity may result in even more drastic linguistic
phenomena such as privatization of language through neologisms
into associative and ungrammatical discourse. Such phenomena
5Source: First Person Account: The Delusion Girl, Diary of a Schizophrenic,
by Antoinette Rosa Ganim. In Selected Articles from Schizophrenia Bulletin, 13,
no. 4 737-739 (1987). (United States Government Printing Office, Washington,
DC, 1987) July 11, 2017 Counseling and Psychotherapy Transcripts, Client
Narratives, and Reference Works https://asp6new.alexanderstreet.com/psyc/psyc.
object.details.aspx?dorpID=1000048455 3/3, (p. 739)
6Wittgensteinian analysis of the “quasi-solipsism” of psychosis, see (Sass, 1994).
express that the Speaker does not take into account what
the Hearer requires in order to understand the Speaker’s
utterances and thus linguistically alienate the Hearer’s perspective
(Pienkos and Sass, 2016).
Narrative Domain Projection Disturbance
(ii)
Not being able to project origos in the Narrative domain
and separate those origos from origos in the speech act
domain reflects another radical disturbance. In this case, one
is not able to separate I-ness here-and-now from I-ness-in-the-
past/future/virtuality. This is represented by route (ii) in Figure 2.
Linguistic counterparts are problems in the use of grammatical
verb tense and aspect as well as temporal and spatial adverbs
to anchor described events in the Narrative Domain versus the
Speech Act Domain. The next excerpt gives an example.
(a) After the sentence extraordinaire (i.e., “Love, and how
important it is for everybody to love everybody”), came the
delusion of all delusions, the main thought that would continue
to dominate my thinking for years to come. (b) The thought was
that of a young man, the person whom I had last been involved
with in a romantic way. (c) The sentence immediately made me
think of my friend, who for some strange reason became the cause
of all causes! (d) He knew all the answers, I thought! (e) This was
not just some answers to some things, but all the answers about
everything to do with life! (f) How could someone be so dumb,
you say, to come to such a conclusion? (g) I don’t know that. (h)
All I can say is that I have always been considered an intelligent
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person, with talents and abilities that have been noted by others.
(i) It was not my intelligence, but rather my sense of religion that
might be compared to one persuaded by a cult. (j) But in this case,
my mind came to this conclusion all by itself. (k) Sometimes it
makes me feel that I just can’t handle all of the complexities of
life. (l) But up to that point I had been excited about life; there
were so many new challenges in my life, and I had just come to a
big city and had fallen in love with all it had to offer.7
In this excerpt, the Speaker uses present perfect (a–f, h), past
(i–j), present (g,h, k), and past perfect (b, l) tense interchangeably
to indicate how she felt at the onset of her illness. In doing to,
she displays skill in the complex interplay of tenses that indicate
different, and at times contradictory and confusing viewpoints
on the time-line within the Narrative Domain. Yet, the boundary
crossing between Speech Act and Narrative domain, as to where
a particular stretch is (to be) represented (or in both at the same
time), is not always clear. In (i), the Speaker’s origo is anchored
in the Narrative Domain by “was,” while “might” anchors it in
Speech Act Domain. This modal verb indicates that the Speaker is
making a tentative observation, but it is unclear when and where
this observation is to be represented: here-and-now, or at the time
of the illness onset, or both? In addition, the boundary between
Speech Act and Narrative domain crossed between sentences (j),
where “came” projects the origo in the Narrative Domain, and
(k) which is a generic utterance which is anchored by “makes”
and “can’t” in the Speech Act Domain, again alternated with
the Narrative Domain in (l) which is signaled by the deixis
of “that point.”
Speech Act and Narrative Domain
Navigation Disturbance (iii)
Being unable to integrate projected viewpoints from the Narrative
Domain in the actual here-and-now indicates a third radical
disturbance. This action is represented in Figure 2 by route
(iii) from Speech Act Domain to Narrative Domain and back.
Linguistic counterparts are inappropriate use of underspecified
pronouns versus overspecified nouns to refer to what is known
versus new, and inappropriate use of indefinite versus definite
articles (cf. the concept of deictic anchoring as proposed
by Zimmerer et al. (2017). An example is provided by the
following excerpt:
(a) I am a dependent on science. (b) My sanity depends
on what fumbly old men can come up with in the area of
discovery. (c) I could praise him, for already he has “cured” my
hallucinations, but my depression prevents me. (d) You can’t be
as smart as the next man if you haven’t had like experiences.8
In this excerpt, it is difficult for the Hearer to anchor the
subject depicted by the Speaker in the Narrative Domain. This
subject is referred to in (c) by the underspecified pronouns “him”
and “he,” which makes it unclear whose origo(s) are (to be)
represented in the Narrative Domain as the subject who “has
cured my hallucinations” (c), since the subsequent sentence (d)
does not resolve this either. As a result, the projection of the origo
of “he” (i.e., the subject who has “cured” hallucinations in the
7Source: First Person Account: The Delusion Girl.
8Source: First Person Account: The Delusion Girl.
past) in the Narrative Domain is hampered through the use of
an underspecified pronoun, which in turn inhibits the integration
of this projected viewpoint into the present in which the Speaker
could praise “him” for his past deed.
DISCUSSION
In developing and applying the Deictic Navigation Network
(DNN) to language in schizophrenia, we aim to enable the
identification of localizable perspectivization disturbances, which
is of importance as it could reveal and clarify fundamental
disturbances in one’s ability to build complex viewpoint
structures in language as well as cognition (Sweetser, 2008).
DNN-analyses may show, for instance, that a patient is perfectly
able to recognize and distinguish perspectives within the Speech
Act Domain (route i) but, to a smaller or larger extent, fails
at separating perspectives in the Speech Act Domain from
perspectives represented in the Narrative Domain, indicating
a difficulty in navigating between her/his own subjective
consciousness and that of others, not present but projected in a
Narrative Domain (route ii).9 Such outcomes would advance our
understanding of the nature of perspective taking disturbances
in schizophrenia.
Ultimately, results would shed a light on gradual differences
in viewpoint taking abilities, and do justice to the rich
and complicated ways in which humans navigate (linguistic)
intersubjective relations. An advantage of this approach is that the
DNN accounts for various inherently different types of viewpoint
disturbances, which can manifest in different combinations, thus
allowing for in-depth insights into the nature of perspectivization
issues at the level of individuals, and of specific patient groups.
Note that each of the disturbances will amount to a fourth,
radical disturbance: an incapability to represent situations from
both a global and a participant viewpoint and negotiate between
the two (Sweetser, 2008). When integration of general knowledge
into the specific interaction in the Speech Act Domain fails, the
common ground between Speaker and Hearer will be hampered,
generating unfounded assumptions of general knowledge in the
Hearer and manifesting itself in the unsuccessful introduction of
new topics. Thus, the DNN can be applied to examine alternative
disorders as well. Autistic Spectrum Disorders, for example,
are characterized by impairments in perspective-taking skills
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). Analyses of the deictic navigation
abilities of people suffering from autism, such as the inability
to navigate temporal expressions (Overweg et al., 2018), could
shed further light on the nature of such impairments, and
the way in which these abilities are conceptually connected
to Theory of Mind (ToM). Deictic navigation within the
Speech Act Domain corresponds to the capability of recognizing
and embodying another subject’s here-and-now-present physical
viewpoint, whereas deictic navigation between the Speech Act
Domain and the Narrative Domain corresponds to the capacity to
think about other subjects as potential subjects-of-consciousness,
9The extent of such failure may be attested by quantification of such instances in
the analysis of a larger corpus of utterances, such as exemplified in Van Krieken
and Sanders (2019).
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that is, persons who may be envisioned in terms of ‘he thinks
that “p” and “he thinks that if p then q” (Goldie, 2007). Such
as depicted in Figure 2, the DNN explains for this phenomenon
in terms of representation in the Narrative Domain and in
the embedded Speech Act Domain, respectively. Navigating the
origos within and between these structures seems a crucial
prerequisite for successful communicative interaction.
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